The Orange County Power Authority (OCPA), a community choice energy agency launched in 2022, is under increased scrutiny regarding the transparency of its energy procurement and the verifiable renewable content of the power it delivers to ratepayers. Concerns, highlighted by former power contractor and utility rate analyst Jim Phelps, point to a perceived difficulty for cities and the public to independently verify OCPA's promoted benefits of local control, lower prices, and greener energy when compared to Southern California Edison (SCE).
A central issue involves the actual energy OCPA delivers, particularly for its highest-priced “100% Renewable” product, which some member cities may consider making their default. Analysis from Phelps suggests that under certain “firm-and-shape wind energy contracts,” wind energy is often not dispatched to serve OCPA load. Instead, this energy may be “substitute power,” including natural gas, which is still advertised as “wind” on power content labels. Irvine Councilmember and OCPA Vice Chair Kathleen Treseder’s claim that all OCPA ratepayers were receiving 95.5% renewable energy has drawn specific attention; this claim, according to Phelps, contradicts a presentation by OCPA’s energy procurement consultant that Treseder attended eight months earlier. Treseder’s claim also overlooks non-renewable substitute power associated with OCPA’s wind, which the analyst notes is not clearly explained to potential OCPA city members.
OCPA's transparency challenges extend to its governance. A 2023 report from the California State Auditor noted that “OCPA does not share the confidential terms of its purchase agreements with its board at open meetings or in closed sessions.” While Irvine Councilmember Treseder later provided unredacted power contracts, allowing Irvine staff to review them, these contracts alone are insufficient, according to the analyst, to establish the annual energy content represented to ratepayers, requiring reconciliation with numerous other records. Unredacted power contracts also do not, by themselves, reveal greenwashing. Similar governance issues have been identified in other community choice agencies; a June 2026 Marin County Civil Grand Jury report, for instance, found problems at Marin Clean Energy, an agency OCPA modeled itself after.
OCPA’s handling of transparency issues also surfaced in its Improvement Plan, a document intended to address prior agency failures. The plan represented a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) with Huntington Beach as a “Transparency” success for OCPA. However, four months earlier, OCPA had denied Huntington Beach’s access to energy procurement records it sought to verify the “100% Renewable” product under that same NDA. This dispute, Phelps notes, contributed to Huntington Beach’s decision to leave OCPA. Subsequently, when OCPA appeared before Fountain Valley’s city council, and was asked about Huntington Beach’s exit, OCPA described it as merely a shift in priorities. This framing, according to Phelps, was central to Fountain Valley’s pending vote to join OCPA.
Financial risks for member cities also concern Phelps. Fountain Valley’s representative on the OCPA board, Glenn Grandis, remains satisfied with the agency's transparency and suggested that if his city wished to depart from OCPA, it could satisfy its financial obligations by selling the energy contracts entered into on its behalf. However, analysis by Phelps warns that liquidating energy contracts effectively places Fountain Valley in the role of a commodities trader, with the city’s general fund ultimately assuming associated risks. This scenario leaves taxpayers exposed, especially after being told that opting out means OCPA “doesn’t affect you.” Phelps further cautions that this proposed departure safety net could face significant challenges during economic downturns, such as a “COVID-type economic downturn,” which saw community choice programs fail or postpone launches. Similarly, if the “AI/data-center growth bubble bursts,” Fountain Valley could be left with relatively high-priced energy contracts. In these situations, customers might have greater incentives to opt out, potentially accelerating a cycle of declining participation and increasing financial pressure on the city’s OCPA obligations—a situation Phelps describes as a potential “death spiral.”
Given these concerns, Phelps emphasizes that cities and ratepayers require transparent information before deciding whether to trust OCPA with their money. He suggests OCPA should disclose energy procurement records from January 1, 2021, through April 30, 2026. Such records, Phelps states, would show, in megawatt-hours, what OCPA purchased, what energy was delivered, what substitute power was supplied, how energy was shaped, how transactions were settled, and how these correspond to advertised energy products. The public, Phelps notes, does not need OCPA’s confidential energy prices to verify the energy content. In light of OCPA’s current transparency issues, an individual’s decision to opt out is presented as a reasonable response, as consumer choice is only truly effective when individuals have enough information to independently evaluate their options.